The sender emphasizes that these are two fundamentally different processes, with the latter being particularly delicate due to the potential risks involved. Specifically, the author points out that a soft fork lacking unanimous support could lead to a chain split, which poses financial risks for miners if not resolved. However, the sender expresses indifference towards these risks.

The author suggests that those concerned about the possibility of a chain split should advocate for an activation client that uses LOT=false, as it virtually eliminates this risk. The sender admits to having little interest in the finer details of activation mechanisms but conjectures that the most effective method for Bitcoin to achieve consensus on changes to its consensus rules is through the publication of activation clients. This would enable users to influence miners regarding their preferences for specific changes.

This perspective underscores the complex nature of governance in decentralized systems like Bitcoin, where consensus is critical yet challenging to achieve. It reflects a pragmatic approach to evolving the network's protocol while acknowledging the inherent contentiousness of such changes among diverse stakeholders.